1,001 Runway Incursions by Wischmeyer, Ed, Ph.D.
Wright State University 
CORE Scholar 
International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology - 2007 
International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology 
2007 
1,001 Runway Incursions 
Ed Wischmeyer Ph.D. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2007 
 Part of the Other Psychiatry and Psychology Commons 
Repository Citation 
Wischmeyer, E. (2007). 1,001 Runway Incursions. 2007 International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 
757-762. 
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2007/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the International Symposium on Aviation Psychology at 
CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Symposium on Aviation Psychology - 2007 by an 
authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu. 
1,001 RUNWAY INCURSIONS
Ed Wischmeyer, Ph.D., ATP / CFI
edwisch@alum.mit.edu
Three years of recent ASRS reports were reviewed to seek factors contributing to runway incursions and taxi errors.
Many factors not commonly discussed in ground safety were found in these 1,049 reports. These factors were then
analyzed from a systems perspective, suggesting that all elements of the system, in the broadest sense, need im-
provement, but as a unified system. It seems unlikely that any meaningful improvements will be achieved without
such a systems approach.
Introduction
“In fact, several investigators, some of whom were
current airline pilots, were confused by the signage
in this area [where the crew missed their turn] when
they observed it on a clear day after the accident.”
NTSB/AAR-91/05, Runway Incursion and Collision,
DTW, December 3, 1990.
Five years ago, an unpublished Boeing research pro-
ject by this author investigated runway incursions and
taxi errors for Part 121 operators. This paper is an
update of that work.
Every factor hypothesized in advance was found in
the  data,  as  well  as  any  number  of  unexpected  and
troubling factors. Training, human factors, and tradi-
tional problems were all found. But, from a systems
engineering point of view, the “system” – including
procedures, regulations, design, information, opera-
tions -- is an evolved system, not designed, with sig-
nificant faults in all sectors and frequent lapses of
coordination across sectors. The data suggest that
sufficient factors are in place to permit a multi-hull
loss event within the boundaries of a US airport, with
an enormous social cost. Further, the data suggest
that the present error rate will not significantly im-
prove without system-wide changes and re-
examination of current assumptions.
Purpose and Limitations
Voluntarily submitted incident reports by their na-
ture do not support “statistically significant” analy-
ses, but tidy statistical analyses are not the objec-
tive. Rather, modern systems theory accepts these
reports as valid indicators of situations where acci-
dents are likely or can be prevented. Conclusions
based on incident reports are then invaluable in ini-
tiating more focused efforts.
Although it is tempting and traditional to assign some
errors, such as mis-communicated instructions, exclu-
sively to flight crew error, the data contains enough
counter-examples to undermine such generalizations.
Methodology
The  data  were  obtained  from  an  online  search,  ob-
taining the most recent three-year data. At the time of
the search, these data were from January, 2003
through January, 2006. The search criteria were
“Conflict – Ground,” Critical and Less Severe, and
“Ground Incursion,” Runway, and Taxiway. This
search generated 2,070 records.
On the first pass through the data, a taxonomy of
errors was generated and significant factors were
noted and recorded. Also on the first pass, reports
were  noted  as  to  their  appropriateness  for  second-
pass processing by omitting events that:
• Did not involve surface operations errors in the
broadest sense
• For wrong runway landings, did not display hu-
man factors elements relative to surface opera-
tions.
• Were attributable to accents of foreign controllers.
This sorting yielded 1,082 reports for second pass
processing.
Factors were grouped into:
• Flight crew factors
• Controller factors
• Information factors (e.g., NOTAMs, charts)
• Communications factors
• Airport factors
During second pass processing, each report was re-
read, and factors present were recorded on the
spreadsheet. After this second pass, it became clear
that  a  third  pass  through  the  data  was  called  for  to
clarify a number of factors.
Third pass processing organized the tabular data,
most significantly the airport location, and the kind of
operation: “High End” (air carrier, air taxi, corporate,
charter, government, military, generally turbine en-
gines) with 723 reports, and “Low end GA” with 326
reports (personal, instructional, generally piston en-
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gines). These data suffice for giving general trends
and indications, even though they do not support
statistical rigor.
There are undoubtedly classification errors in this
analysis as the tabulation work was so mind-numbing
as to make consistency difficult and double-checking
arduous. For example, the tabulation of confusion on
“what’s the active runway” was probably under-
reported. However, the purpose of this analysis was
to identify significant factors, not to generate statisti-
cally significant tallies – as if true statistical signifi-
cance were possible from such data. The complete
raw data and factors categorization are available from
the author.
In a number of cases, hold short line locations and
airport geometries were investigated using Google
Earth. Airport diagrams were often accessed via
www.airnav.com, and over 40 airport diagrams were
accessed on line for clarification of narratives. In
addition, communications with FAA personnel con-
tributed to this paper.
Observations and Speculations
Analysis -- Expectations1, 2
The data recorded instances in which controllers
stated in the reports that they expected that a flight
crew:
• Will see and be able to follow all signs and
markings
• Can accept a changed taxi clearance without
error while taxiing
• Can accept a changed departure clearance while
taxiing without a taxi error
• Will take a specific taxiway without being told
• Will expedite without being told
• Will taxi across runways and taxiways fast
enough for separation (controllers can’t tell a
single engine taxi or starting a taxi uphill which
can slow the speed of crossing)
• Can abort a takeoff at any time
• Will make the requested runway turnoff
• Will not go around unannounced
• Can perform a go around at any time
1 The theme of “expectations” originates from Kath-
leen O’Brien, FAA Safety Program Manager, LGB.
Personal conversation.
2 Observations and Speculations are space-limited,
and some points were omitted. Full data is available
to support these summarizations.
• Can accept a taxi clearance while on the landing
roll, even during the noise of reverse thrust
operation.
• Will handle conditions and procedures peculiar
to that airport without any additional coaching
from ATC
• Do not need readback for error avoidance
• Will pick up any changed conditions at that air-
port without ATC emphasizing the changes
The data recorded common pilot expectations that:
• Hold short lines will be near runway ends
• If there is an ILS line, there is a hold short line
beyond
• They will be able to successfully operate at any
airport using “standard” procedures
• There will be signs to support every turn of a taxi
clearance.3
The data recorded pilots’ frequent expectations at
non-towered fields that:
• All transmissions from this aircraft were heard
by all other pilots, regardless of how long ago
those transmissions were made.
• No matter how short a time this aircraft has been
on frequency,  it’s  been long enough to  have  re-
ceived all relevant transmissions.
• Received transmissions from other aircraft have
been sufficient that looking for traffic is not re-
quired
• Turning on lights or making radio calls also ob-
viate the need for looking
• Everybody flies a standard approach, so there is
no need to look for short approaches, high ap-
proaches, etc.
• Everybody will see this aircraft regardless of the
kind of approach flown
• “Position and hold” is safe if announced on the
radio
The data recorded airport operators’ expectations
that:
• Hold  short  lines  will  be  observed,  regardless  of
the location relative to the runway end
• All signs and markings will be visible from both
seats  of  a  taxiing  aircraft,  or  from the  pilot  of  a
tailwheel aircraft
• Construction markings will be seen, no matter
how they are displayed.
3 “They had begun to rely totally on the airfield signs
and markings they observed through the fog to com-
ply with the controller’s instructions.”
NTSB/AAR-91/05, page 56. (Detroit runway
incursion and collision.)
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Comparing High End and Low End Operators
The earlier Boeing study was, naturally enough, lim-
ited to Part 121 and 135 operators only. For this
study, operators were grouped into “high end” (air
carrier / major, air carrier / regional, air taxi, corpo-
rate, etc.) and “low end” (personal and instructional.)
For all of the factors tabulated, per cent occurrences
were generated for high end and low end operators.
Many factors were found more commonly in high
end, such as having the first officer doing tasks re-
lated to the flight but unrelated to taxiing the aircraft
when the taxi error occurred. Uncleared or wrong
runway takeoffs and landings were more prevalent in
low end operations, but those statistics are misleading
– from a systems safety point of view, what’s impor-
tant is not which group makes the error more often;
what’s important is what those errors point out as
opportunities for improvement.
Events occurring more frequently with high end op-
erators include:
• Second pilot off line or distracted, such as with
checklists and closeout tasks, when the taxi error
or runway incursion occurred
• Taxiing pilot did not back up the Pilot Not Flying
(PNF) on the radio, sometimes abrogating respon-
sibility for listening to radio communications.
• Fatigue
• Receiving instructions from ATC too late for
compliance, that caused confusion, or that came
on rollout
Events occurring more frequently with low end op-
erators include:
• Stress and time pressure
• Uncleared or wrong runway takeoffs and landings
Other Human Factors
Hold short lines in unexpected places were a com-
mon problem, with 35 events noted. The data suggest
that pilots may not start looking for hold short lines
until cued by the end of the runway. There were also
cases of single hold short lines serving multiple run-
ways, no hold short line past an ILS critical area line,
and  one  report  of  hold  short  lines  that  all  had  the
dashed and solid sections reversed. It is clear that
hold short lines in unexpected locations with no addi-
tional cues will create errors.
One phenomenon discovered in these data is the
“greater than 90 degree turn” problem. It appears that
pilots associate the word “turn” with a turn of 90 de-
grees or less. And although English has verbs for
proceed, zig, and veer, English does not have a com-
monly used verb or even an adverb to describe turn-
ing more than 90 degrees. There were eleven reports
involving turns greater than 90 degrees, nine from
high end operators.4
An hypothesized phenomena found in the data were
runway signs not visible to the taxiing pilot, for both
high and low end operators. In another case, a B737
pilot was unable to see any of the taxiway when in-
structed to make a 135 degree right turn.
In addition to the problems with the first officer off
line, there were a number of cases in which the pilot
taxiing paid inadequate attention to the radio. Some-
times company policy dictated that the pilot taxiing
monitor Comm 2 or perform distracting duties while
taxiing.
Some reports support speculation that pilot age may
be a factor in inattentiveness, as captains are gener-
ally  older  than  first  officers.  However,  ASRS  does
not capture pilot age.
There were also cases in which onboard mechanical
voices blocked reception of radio messages. The
Honeywell Runway Awareness and Advisory System
(RAAS)  systems  was  cited  in  two  cases,  and  the
other report was of a traffic warning system that went
off on the ground.
Also noted were eight instances of taxiway names,
wherein the flight crew had difficulty or were unable
to find a designated taxiway on the chart because of
arbitrary and capricious taxiway naming schemes.
One reporter observed that inner and outer loops
were not labeled consistently at different airports,
suggesting that letters and numerals alone may not
always suffice.
There were numerous cases of inadequately marked
runway and taxiway closures, and where poor mark-
ings caused confusion.
There were also cases of “rote reply, no comply”
where the flight crew parroted an instruction and then
did something else. Only three of these eight reports
were from low end operators.
4 It may or may not be significant that the 1990 De-
troit runway incursion accident and the 2006 Lexing-
ton wrong runway takeoff each involved critical turns
of more than 90 degrees.
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The data also suggest that airline crews may not be able
to see hold short lines under the nose, not just because of
taxi lights but also because of poor visibility.
It is significant that acknowledgement of transmis-
sions is the first line defense against communications
errors. However, four per cent of reports were of fre-
quency congestion or busy controllers, situations
compromising this defense.
There were, of course, the traditional problems of
frequency congestion, readback / hearback, poorly
maintained markings, signs and lights.
Four per cent of the reports (39) related to confusion
between “hold position,” “hold short,” “position and
hold,” and even takeoff clearance, with similar rates
from both high- and low-end operators. Reports
suggest this is because different instructions re-use
the  same  words,  and  not  from  confusion  with
ICAO terminology.
A major surprise in these data is the number of re-
ports of controllers either berating or deliberately
delaying flight crews following a perceived error.5
The data showed 43 events, of which seven contrib-
uted  to  a  further  problem.  These  data  showed  low-
end operators receiving such treatment 1.8 times
more frequently than high end operators. And, in the
study of five years ago, such events were unheard of.
There were also 12 cases of controller unintelligibil-
ity (at US airports) due to poor enunciation or exces-
sive speech rate.
Last are the questions of, “What is an active runway?
And how do you find out which ones are active?”
Information so important ought to be extremely easy
to  find.  However,  a  brief  search  of  FAR  91,  the
Aeronautical Information Manual, and the Pilot-
Controller glossary gave no guidance on how to de-
termine which runway(s) are active. Reports indicate
that pilots are not alone in this confusion, and with
some reports of controllers regarding all runways as
“active” and not to be crossed without a clearance.
Systems Engineering Observations
Both Reason’s model and its derivative, HFACS,
state in effect that management is the ultimate cause
of all problems. A similar concept is to look at the
5 Multiple sources suggest that the problem is not
new, but has not been previously reported.
“system” in the broadest sense and examine the sys-
tem for potential flaws.6
From that perspective, the “system” has serious and
troubling problems, both at the component level and
at the higher level. Many of the components seem to
have evolved in isolation from the other components,
so there is no obvious coherent design, let alone tight
coordination among components.
The elements of the system, in the broadest sense,
include:
1. Airport designers, specifying pavements, signs,
and markings and changes to those. In many
cases, the present pavement arrangements, sign-
age, and markings are setups for accidents. In-
deed, from a systems safety point of view, a “hot
spot” is a public admission that the system is
known to be broken and has not been fixed. “WE
WERE LOOKING FOR A RWY SIGN THAT
HAS A 3 ON IT… IF THE RWY SIGNAGE
WOULD HAVE SAID 3-21 I WOULD HAVE
HELD SHORT…. EVERYONE INVOLVED
IN THIS INCIDENT EXCEPT THE PLTS
WERE  WELL  AWARE  OF  THE  SIGN  AND
MISIDENTIFICATION OF THE RWY PROB”
(666402).7 Other reports suggest that Cleveland
airport  has  an  elevated  risk  of  a  major  surface
collision accident with its three closely spaced
runways because pilots often crossed the center
runway unknowingly and thought they were
cleared across the “next” runway.
2. Airport maintainers, who insure that signs, lights
and markings are in order and clearly visible,
who implement airport designs, and who mark
areas and runways closed for construction.
“THIS IS A RECURRING PROB, THERE IS
NO INTENTION AT THIS TIME TO SPEND
MONEY ON REPLACING THE SIGN WITH
A PROPERLY DESCRIPTIVE ONE.” (666402)
3. Pilots, who operate within the system. There
were 16 cases of pilots crossing the runway
cleared to, split equally among high and low end
operators. “TAXI TO RWY 17… RWYS 17
AND 13… WERE BOTH ACTIVE. SINCE NO
HOLD SHORT OF ANY TXWY OR RWY
WAS GIVEN, ACCORDINGLY NO HOLD




7 Quotes in ALL CAPS are from ASRS reports, and
the number in parentheses is the ASRS ACN (access
control number).
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SHORT INSTRUCTIONS WERE READ
BACK. I UNDERSTOOD THAT I COULD
CROSS BOTH RWYS.” (626096)
4. Government, including controllers, briefers,
NOTAM maintainers, showed inadequate atten-
tion  to  detail  and  procedures.  “THE  ACFT
PASSED THE HOLD SIGN FOR RWY
28L/10R AND HELD SHORT OF THE RWY
EDGE PAINT STRIPE. TFC WAS ROLLING
OUT RWY 28L LNDG ROLL... THE CON-
CERN I HAVE IS THAT MY FELLOW
CTLRS, INCLUDING THE CIC AT THE TIME
WHO I BROUGHT THE INCIDENT UP TO,
DID NOT UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IN
FACT IS A RWY INCURSION.” (663936)
5. Regulators, who write and update regulations
and government publications. In my opinion, the
suite of government regulations and guidelines
need major revision. For example, the pilot /
controller glossary contains this prose: “In the
metering sense, a selectable adapted item which
specifies the landing runway configuration or di-
rection of traffic flow. The adapted optimum
flight plan from each transition fix to the vertex
is determined by the runway configuration for ar-
rival metering processing purposes.” All pilots
will, of course, recognize that prose as the sec-
ond half of the definition of “active runway.”
6. Training material writers and approvers. Failings
in online training and Flight Instructor Refresher
clinics could be the subject of multiple papers.
Other research indicated that online training ma-
terials for the FAA Wings program are not re-
viewed for correctness by the FAA, and AOPA
Air Safety Foundation offerings were found to
contain numerous errors.8
7. Operators and POIs, who specify operating pro-
cedures. “COMPANY PROC IS TO GET OUR
WT AND BAL DATA DURING TAXI. DOING
THIS  PRIOR  TO  TAXI  WOULD  BE  A
MEANS OF REDUCING DISTRS DURING
TAXI.” (615367)
8. The general public. There seems to be public
pressure to accept unknown risks for the unquan-
tified perceived benefits of greater system capac-
ity. “THEIR ATTEMPT TO COMPLETE TOO
MANY OPS CREATED AN UNSAFE OP.
LAHSO'S ARE NO LONGER ALLOWED ON
THAT RWY AND THEY WERE TRYING TO
DO IT 'UNDER THE TABLE.' ” (577057) From
a systems safety point of view, where are the
8 Wischmeyer, Ed. “AOPA Air Safety Foundation
Online ‘Training,’ Anybody Minding the Store?”
InFlight USA, March, 2006, page 25. Published in
San Mateo, CA.
policy documents quantifying the risks of and
justifying such public policy?
Meaningful improvements will not come  from  ATC
working on terminology in isolation; nor by a review
of signage and markings in isolation; nor by recom-
mendations for new procedures and rules; nor by any
other system component being addressed in isolation.
Systems engineering and safety science theory state
that meaningful improvements will come when each
component of the system is reviewed and improved
within the context of the entire system.
Conclusions and Speculations
Although accidents are used to generate specific rec-
ommendations for improvement, modern safety sci-
ence suggests that additional factors may be gleaned
from the implications and hints present is the “soft”
data of incident reports, such as were analyzed for
this paper.
The reasonable inferences from this data set are:
1. Sufficient elements are currently in place to per-
mit a multi-hull loss airline accident within
boundaries of a major US airport. For example,
there was a surface collision between two small
freighters at Milwaukee on January 25, 2007,
with one hull loss.
2. Unless sweeping and overdue improvements are
made to the entire airport system, there is little
reason to expect any significant improvement in
runway incursion and taxi error rates. Training
and additional flight crew procedures have not
been shown to generate sufficient safety im-
provements.9
3. The most likely means of substantially reducing
error rate is with a systems approach, re-
examining all assumptions.
4. The greatest safety improvement available in the
short term is to remove distractions from taxiing
pilots, such as weight and balance calculations,
company radio calls, and FMS programming.
For  airline  crews,  this  may  mean  changes  in
SOPs so that whenever the aircraft is in motion,
all crewmembers are paying full attention to the
taxi task.
5. The frequent reports of controllers berating and
allegedly unnecessarily delaying pilots indicate a
need for prompt improvement.
6. The public policy that compromises the risks of
runway incursions and taxi errors for greater sys-
tem capacity and reduced regulatory costs does
not seem to be documented and signed.
9 John Cox, personal conversation.
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As one wide-body captain wrote after a near-collision
at  SFO,  “WE  (THE  INDUSTRY)  COULD  DO
BETTER ABOUT AIRING SOLUTIONS AS WELL
AS HAMMERING INTO THE CREWS THAT WE
HAVE A PROB.” (614437)
Appendices
Appendix 1.  Number of reports by airport for “high
end” operators (air carrier, air taxi, charter, corpo-
rate, government, military)
Rank Airport  Number  Rank Airport Number
1 ORD 31 13 LAS 13
2 CLE 26 14 EWR 12
3 MIA 22 15 SAT 11
3 PHL 22 15 CLT 11
5 DFW 21 17 CYYZ 10
6 SFO 19 17 MKE 10
7 LAX 16 17 SNA 10
8 ATL 15 17 TEB 10
8 MDW 15 21 IAD 9
10 BOS 14 22 CVG 8
10 BWI 14 22 LGB 8
10 LGA 14 22 ONT 8
22 STL 8
Appendix 2.  Number of reports by airport for “Low
End (GA)” operators (personal and instructional)
Rank Airport  Number  Rank Airport  Number
1 LGB 13 4  SBA  6
2 HOU 7 6 PBI 5
2 PDK 7 7 DAB 4
4 SGJ 6 7  HPN  4
Appendix 3.  Reports by operator category
Air Carrier / Major 378






Total "high end" reports 732
Instructional 44
Personal 282
Total "low end" reports 326
Quotes from Privileged Safety Sources
• I was in a car [at a confusing taxiway intersec-
tion] with a controller supervisor who’d been
working there 15 years, and he said, I don’t
know where we are.
• I  knew  what  I  was  looking  for,  and  it  was  still
ready hard. (at North Las Vegas)
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